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Agenda for action
Reasonable levels of public 
funding need to be allocated to health-
improving activities
An outcome-oriented approach is needed 
to fund intersectoral actions and 
address misalignment of incentives across 
sectors
1
3
2
4
More explicit criteria should be used 
to prioritize the health budget linked to 
development and health objectives 
Incentives should be aligned and 
optimized across the service delivery 
interface to reinforce a service delivery 
model oriented to population outcomes
202
Motivation 
Previous chapters have presented ambitious agendas for transforming 
public health, primary care and specialist services to scale-up core 
NCD interventions and services. Health financing arrangements (rev-
enue collection, pooling, purchasing and benefit design) are powerful 
enablers of such transformation, ensuring availability of funding for the 
right services at the right time, and providing behavioural incentives.  
Unfortunately, however, health financing arrangements in many coun-
tries not only do not facilitate transformative agendas but may actually 
hinder them, as shown in Chapter 5. The following issues pose a par-
ticular challenge when it comes to scaling up core NCD interventions 
and services: 
 n significant underfunding of health systems in several Euro-
pean countries, in particular for prevention and health promotion; 
 n lack of explicit priority-setting processes, which undermines 
governments’ ability to allocate resources in line with stated  policy 
objectives and targets, and results in ineffective governance 
 arrangements for holding actors accountable for results; 
 n ineffective models to fund population interventions, including 
intersectoral action, and limited use of incentives to promote health 
promotion and preventive activities; and
 n misaligned incentives throughout the individual service deliv-
ery network, which undervalue health promotion and prevention, 
 reinforce specialist and hospital orientation of care provision and 
episodic rather than continuous care. 
In this chapter, we propose four key policy messages for a more effec-
tive health financing strategy to address these challenges in a compre-
hensive and aligned health system response to NCDs. Each message 
aims to provide specific policy recommendations, while recognizing 
that at this particular time there may not be clear evidence or consen-
sus in some policy areas. In such cases, we have set out the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the various options for consideration.    
We take the view that financing strategies for NCDs cannot be sep-
arated from financing strategies for the health system as a whole. 
The concept of funding NCD interventions per se suggests a verti-
cal, programme-based approach and is at odds with sustainability 
and systems thinking. Throughout the chapter, we consider overall 
health system financing strategies that support the scale-up of core 
NCD interventions and services rather than talking about funding NCD 
inter ventions directly in a narrow sense. In more practical terms, this 
means identifying revenue-raising and pooling arrangements to ensure 
sufficient health revenues, prioritizing these revenues and considering 
the implications of how they could be allocated to the organizations 
and individuals expected to deliver core interventions and services. 
The approach has to be holistic and the case for investment needs 
to be strong, whether for NCDs or for other areas. The strategies we 
propose will therefore be helpful not only for scaling up NCD-specific 
interventions, but also for improving all health outcomes where ser-
vice delivery strategies are based on health promotion and prevention 
through intersectoral action (such as road safety) and on integrated 
primary care centred service delivery (such as maternal and child 
health and tuberculosis care).  
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Reasonable levels of public 
funding need to be allocated to 
health-improving activities
Ensuring sufficient fiscal space for health 
There is a strong business case for investing in health, and in NCD 
interventions in particular. Yet insufficient funding remains one of the 
most frequently noted obstacles to progress. The overall funding en-
velope for NCDs comes from the budgets of the health sector and 
other sectors engaged in intersectoral activities that affect – among 
other social objectives – NCD outcomes. In this chapter, we will focus 
on the former in key messages 1 and 2, and on the latter in key mes-
sage 3. If a health system is underfunded in general, NCD interven-
tions will certainly be underfunded. A united effort by all stakeholders 
in health and welfare is therefore needed to secure sufficient fiscal 
space for health, with appropriate priorities and effective mechanisms 
for resource allocation and purchasing, to ensure equity and efficiency. 
To understand policy options for increasing government spending on 
health, it is helpful to decompose government spending on health into 
two factors: overall fiscal space (how much public revenue countries 
want to and can collect through taxes and other fiscal instruments); 
and the decision to allocate these funds across sectors and in particu-
lar to health. The former will depend on the size of government, the 
degree of economic development and the strength and transparency 
of public institutions, and can only grow with long-term economic and 
institutional development, while the latter is an annual policy decision 
and therefore more amenable to change in the short run. It is impor-
tant for health stakeholders to engage in dialogue on both of these 
factors: to support overall taxation efforts that ultimately benefit the 
sector on the one hand, and to participate in a fiscal dialogue about 
resource allocation on the other. 
 
Government spending on health in the WHO 
European Region ranges from 4% to 22% of over-
all national budgets, reflecting substantial variation in 
 priorities and commitments (see Figure 12.1). When it comes 
to considering what proportion of public funding should be allocat-
ed to health, there is no universally accepted standard. Furthermore, 
some aspects of health system responsibility lie outside the health 
system and health budget (including children’s health, long-term care 
and welfare) and therefore add to the complexity of this matter.  
There are, however, guidelines on what constitutes too little. In the 
WHO European Region, when a government spends less than 12% of 
its budget on health, more problems are reported regarding access to 
quality care and weaker financial protection (Thomson et al., 2018, in 
press). Other signals of underfunding may also be documented, such 
as informal payments, lack of supplies and medicines, gaps in staff-
ing, service dilution and waiting lists. Since public health and health 
promotion are more likely to suffer from disproportionately low funding 
when fiscal space is tight (see Chapter 7), significant underfunding 
will ultimately impact on the health of the population (Bokhari, 2007; 
Moreno-Serra & Smith, 2015). 
Over the past decade, the priority given to health in national budg-
ets has increased slightly in high-income countries in the European 
Region, and now averages just above 14% (see Figure 12.2). In upper 
middle-income countries, on the other hand, government spending on 
health has reduced to an average of 10% of national budgets. These 
contrasting trends have widened the gap in prioritization of health in 
government budgeting processes between high- and upper middle-
income countries. Despite lower middle-income countries having the 
most constrained fiscal space, the priority given to health in their na-
tional budgets has increased significantly over the past decade. 
1KeyMessage 
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Figure 12.1. General government spending on health as a percentage of overall government spending, 2014 
EURO 49: WHO European Region Member States; data for Israel missing and three small countries excluded. 
Source: WHO Global Health Expenditure Database, 2017.
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Irrespective of the proportion of government funds allocated to health, 
a comprehensive approach is essential to efficiently translate funding 
into better health outcomes. The dual strategy of “more money for 
health and more health for the money available”, which emphasizes 
efficiency gains, is critically important for addressing NCDs. In many 
health systems, resource allocation decisions at the subsystem level 
are implicit. They follow historical patterns and may still be linked to 
existing structures and staffing, and therefore do not always reflect 
present needs. In such systems, funding does not translate automat-
ically into core services and interventions. This means that in addition 
to advocating for reasonable fiscal space for health, a much stronger 
push must be made to develop more transparent and effective priority-
setting processes (key message 2) and resource allocation mecha-
nisms to ensure that the additional funds benefit the interventions and 
services that can have the greatest impact (key messages 3 and 4). 
Beyond these general recommendations, however, individual coun-
try context is essential when identifying an appropriate priority-setting 
strategy. As the four country vignettes in Box 12.1 show, the extent 
of fiscal space, prioritization of health in government spending, extent 
of efficiency gains already harnessed, and attainment of outcomes 
all inter relate in a complex manner. This means that an appropriate 
balance must be struck between advocating for new funding, and 
optimizing the use of existing funds. Increasing government funding 
may not always be at the frontline of that strategy. In some cases, 
while there may not be any scope for expansion of fiscal space, there 
may be scope to improve outcomes through efficiency gains (see 
Kyrgyzstan). Alternatively, health may already be a high priority in the 
government budget with excellent outcomes, which means that the 
task for the future would be to sustain those outcomes (as is the case 
in Spain and Sweden). There are unequivocal cases, however, where 
obvious efficiency gains have been achieved and any further improve-
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Figure 12.2. General government spending on health as a percentage of overall government spending, 2000–2015
Source: WHO Global Health Expenditure Database, 2017.
Note: HIC = high-income countries, UMIC = upper middle-income countries, LMIC = lower middle-income countries. 
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The Latvian Government spends less 10% of its resources 
on health.  Latvia’s premature mortality rate for NCDs is 
at the upper end of the range for high-income countries. 
Low spending translates into gaps in resources for 
core interventions and services, and in coverage (WHO 
Regional Office for Europe, 2017a). Coverage of cost-
effective medicines in particular is low and contributes 
to the high financial burden and access barriers that 
ultimately impact on effectiveness.  Latvia has squeezed 
its system to deliver outcomes through efficiency gains. 
The good news is that there is fiscal space to increase 
health spending. With strong priority-setting and 
purchasing arrangements, the allocation of additional 
funds will have a significant and swift impact on NCD 
outcomes and financial protection. 
With one of the lowest premature mortality rates in 
the WHO European Region, Sweden is universally 
acknowledged as having a strong health system 
embedded in a strong welfare state. Sweden’s focus on 
intersectoral approaches and equity-enhancing policies 
is of great interest to the rest of the Region.  Regarding 
financing, Sweden spends 18% of its State budget on 
health. This proportion of funding not only translates into 
excellent health outcomes through strong priority-setting 
but also enables good and timely quality of care to be 
provided in a manner that responds to user expectations. 
The task for the future will be to maintain these outcomes 
at an affordable cost.  
In Kyrgyzstan, the priority given to health in government 
spending increased from below 10% in 2010 to 13% in 
2015 (Data based on calculations by the Government of 
Kyrgyzstan, not the WHO GHED).  Increased funding 
has resulted in improved services for several reasons, 
including better priority-setting with increased funding for 
primary care, population- and output-based purchasing 
mechanisms and enhanced primary care and community 
outreach (Jakab & Manjieva, 2008). Although this has 
translated into improved NCD outcomes, there is room 
to improve further by scaling up population interventions 
and individual services (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 
2015a). There is, however, consensus that there is no more 
significant fiscal space to increase allocations for health in 
the medium term and thus efficiency gains must be at the 
heart of the health financing strategy. There is evidence of 
inefficiencies that need to be addressed as the next step in 
improving system performance.
Outcomes for premature NCD mortality in Spain are 
among the best in the European Region.  The Government 
allocates 15% of its overall spending to health. Great 
attention has been paid to enhancing efficiency, partially 
necessitated by the financial crisis. Spain increasingly 
implements population interventions and intersectoral 
approaches with attention to redressing inequalities.  Its 
strong multidisciplinary primary health care is well known 
throughout Europe, as is its approach to a streamlined 
and well regionalized specialist care. The efficiency of 
the Spanish system is demonstrated by low numbers of 
avoidable admissions for NCDs such as coronary heart 
disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and 
diabetes (OECD, 2017). Maintaining a balanced approach 
between prioritizing health, focusing on efficiency gains 
and allocating funding to effective interventions and 
services have contributed and will continue to contribute 
good outcomes at reasonable cost.  
Latvia Sweden
Kyrgyzstan Spain 
Box 12.1 Context of revenue generation in four countries
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ment in outcomes will be difficult without additional funding for scaling 
up interventions and services (such as in Latvia). 
Making a better business case to invest in 
health 
A potentially effective way to increase the priority given to health 
spending in the government budget would be to invest in capacities 
to make a better business case for health. In many countries, the 
health sector has not generally been a strong negotiator in the annual 
budget process, and investing in capacity to make the business case 
for health has not been a priority. Against that background, cross-sec-
toral dialogues between health and finance were often unproductive, 
did not reflect the pursuit of the common goal of societal welfare, and 
lacked mutual understanding of perspectives. To move towards a 
more collab orative and productive approach, with equality of voice 
and perspectives, ministries of finance need to recognize the econom-
ic and social costs of illhealth and the adverse effects of the high finan-
cial burden on the population caused by direct payments. Ministries of 
health need to make a stronger case for investing in health and focus 
on potential efficiency gains as a source of funds. Demonstrating the 
economic and social dividends of investing in health and reducing in-
equalities, showing the benefits of efficiency gains already made, and 
having a multiyear plan for addressing remaining inefficiencies will en-
hance the credibility of the health sector among economists and pub-
lic financing experts in the negotiation process. 
The business case for investing in NCD interventions and services 
is particularly strong, with general agreement on three points: the 
economic consequences of NCDs are staggering; costs of scaling 
up core interventions and services are low compared with the costs 
of their burden; and the returns on scale-up are enormous (World 
Economic Forum, 2015; WHO & UNDP, 2016). These three points 
can form the basis of arguments in country-specific business cases. 
Importantly, significant benefits of investment in health occur beyond 
the health system, for example a more productive population and few-
er sick days taken, which results in greater economic growth better 
educational attainment, among others (McDaid & Park, 2016; McDaid, 
Sassi & Merkur, 2015; Devaux & Sassi, 2015; Leal et al., 2006; Luengo 
Fernandez, Leal & Sullivan 2012). The returns on investment are par-
ticularly significant in upper middle-income countries with high pre-
mature mortality from cardiovascular disease or a fast growing NCD 
burden (Schuhrcke et al., 2007; Chisholm et al., 2011). 
 n Globally, the projected cumulative lost output from NCDs for the 
period 2011–2025 is US$ 7 trillion in lower middle-income countries, 
which equates to roughly 4% of annual GDP. This far outweighs the 
estimated US$ 11.2 billion cost of implementing core NCD inter-
ventions and services in those countries (WHO & UNDP, 2016). 
 n In the European Union, NCDs result in the premature death 
of some 550 000 people of working age every year. This rep-
resents a loss of 3.4 million potential productive life years and 
amounts to a loss of 0.8% of European Union GDP. In addition, 
the equivalent of 1.7% of European Union GDP is spent on sick 
leave and disability payments each year (OECD, 2016). This 
is on top of the direct treatment costs associated with NCDs. 
 n Although there are no comprehensive estimates for the eastern 
part of the WHO European Region, high rates of premature 
mortality (which is more pronounced among men) suggest that the 
labour market impact of NCDs is high and the returns on invest-
ment would therefore be even greater. In Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and 
Turkey, for example, business cases for investing in NCDs have 
recently been developed, for use in the budgetary process and 
to inform parliamentarians. All three countries experience a con-
siderable economic burden from NCDs and are therefore likely to 
see significant returns from scaling up NCD core interventions and 
services (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2017b; WHO Regional 
Office for Europe, 2018 in press; WHO Regional Office for Europe, 
2018 forthcoming; see Table 12.1). 
To ensure sustainability and long-term impact, these approaches need 
to be institutionalized in routine budget formation through a mandat-
ed process, and credible evidence needs to be presented to poli-
cy-makers in a comprehensive and accessible manner. There must 
also be the political know-how to communicate these messages to 
an audience not versed in the intricate details of public health and 
the health system. Investment in that regard is therefore essential 
to strengthen health system governance. Recognizing the great po-
tential in this area, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) explicitly promotes and supports dialogue, and 
has created the Joint Network of Health and Budget Officials on the 
Fiscal Sustainability of Health Systems. Annual Network meetings at 
the global and regional levels bring together health and budget officials 
to discuss key issues affecting the sustainability of health systems and 
to exchange perspectives on budgeting processes in OECD member 
States. The Network has been widely regarded as a successful part-
nership for overcoming well known sectoral divides. Its success has 
prompted other organizations to join and create similar networks in 
other subregions and regions.20  The WHO Regional Office for Europe 
20 http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/sbonetworkonhealthexpenditures.htm (accessed 28 
February 2018).
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has joined forces with OECD to increase the number of countries cov-
ered in the Network and to support joint subregional meetings. 
Engaging in long-term fiscal dialogue and 
strengthening the budget process 
So far, this chapter has described complex systemic changes to 
achieve a shift in funding in favour of the health system, which would 
also have a positive impact on NCDs. From the perspective of wanting 
to have a greater and faster impact on NCDs, however, these changes 
are complex, have long horizons and require public funding invest-
ments in capacity and institutions. Calls for simpler solutions are in-
creasing, such as leveraging consumption taxes related to NCD risk 
factors and earmarking them for health-enhancing activities. 
The public health impact of consumption taxes on tobacco, alcohol, 
and nutrition is unequivocally significant; tobacco tax at 75% of retail 
price has proven the most consistent and cost-effective way to reduce 
tobacco use. These taxes also yield significant additional revenue for 
government budgets and therefore represent a win-win policy instru-
ment for public health and public finance (WHO, 2016a). 
At the same time, partially or fully earmarking these types of tax rev-
enue for health is controversial and has generated considerable de-
bate (WHO, 2016b; Cashin, Sparkes & Bloom, 2017). Earmarking is 
a budgetary practice whereby the proceeds of a tax are designated 
for a particular purpose (expenditure). In the WHO European Region, 
examples include the earmarking of tobacco tax for the health system 
and public health in Poland (until 2015b) and Romania (WHO, 2016a), 
and tax on unhealthy foods and drinks, introduced in Hungary in 2011 
(WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2015). Earmarking can take many 
forms and its impact depends partly on its design features. How it 
is integrated into the annual budget and public finance management 
processes is also important.  “Hard” earmarking is when designat-
ed funds to some extent bypass budget formation controls (such as 
parliament) and public finance management controls (such as the 
treasury), while “soft earmarking” is when tax proceeds go through the 
treasury and are subject to annual parliamentary review. 
There are several potentially positive effects of earmarking consump-
tion taxes from tobacco, food and alcohol for health. It may improve 
the allocative efficiency of public spending by linking taxes to the pro-
vision of services or benefits that are proven to be cost-effective and 
Table 12.1. Economic costs of NCDs and return on investments in three countries
Belarus Kyrgyzstan Turkey
Costs % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP
Direct health-care costs of NCDs* 0.27 0.82 1.27 
Indirect costs of NCDs (loss from premature death, absenteeism and 
presenteeism)**
5.13 3.1 2.31 
Overall cost of NCDs 5.4 3.9 3.6
Return on investment at 15 years
Salt reduction 94 12.3 88
Tobacco control 31.1 3.8 5
Alcohol control 12 - 0.6
Physical activity awareness 5.2 3.6 2.3
Cardiovascular diseases and diabetes clinical interventions *** 0.6 0.01 4.3
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2017b; WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2018 in press; WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2018 forthcoming. 
*NCDs include cardiovascular disease, chronic respiratory diseases, diabetes and cancer, unless otherwise specified.
**In calculating the indirect costs of absenteeism and presenteeism in all three countries, the indirect costs of chronic respiratory diseases and cancer were not included.
***Diabetes was not included under the clinical interventions package in Kyrgyzstan.
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are currently underprovided, such as using the revenue from tobacco 
excise taxes for smoking cessation or prevention activities. It may also 
improve public acceptance of taxes (Bird, 2015; Doetinchem, 2010). 
This is particularly important for tobacco tax, where progress has been 
slow, despite overwhelming evidence. Earmarking tobacco tax reve-
nues for health can be a useful economic tool to build consensus and 
garner political support (WHO, 2016a). Finally, in contexts of rigid public 
financial management systems, if tax revenues are channelled into ex-
trabudgetary funds for health promotion and prevention, there can be 
more flexibility in the types of activities funded (WHO, 2016a). 
Aside from these positive attributes, there is less consensus with re-
spect to the impact of earmarking in increasing fiscal space for health. 
In contexts where budgetary priority-setting is weak, the introduction 
of earmarked revenues has mobilized resources for previously under-
funded health-related activities (such as health promotion and mental 
health) (WHO, 2016a). It is important, however, to note that earmarking 
of a particular tax may not improve the fiscal space for health overall 
because other sources of funding from general budget revenues may 
be reduced by the same or an even greater amount, thus offsetting 
any potential gains (Cashin, Sparkes & Bloom 2017; Bird, 2015; Kutzin 
et al., 2007). Earmarking may therefore solve one problem (providing 
greater funding for NCD prevention) while creating another (reducing 
the overall funding envelope for other health activities). It can also cause 
fragmentation in pooling arrangements, thus undermining the possibil-
ity of redistributing to activities that have a greater impact on health or 
equity (Cashin, Sparkes & Bloom, 2017; Kutzin et al., 2007). 
Earmarking can fragment and undermine transparent budget formation 
processes linked to criteria based on social policy objectives. Hard ear-
marking in particular, where designated funds bypass budget formation 
controls (parliament) and public finance management controls (treasury) 
may contribute to reduced transparency. 
Overall, earmarking alone does not solve the problem of generating suf-
ficient resources for health, and, in some cases, it may even do the 
opposite. Building and strengthening comprehensive fiscal dialogue 
and a transparent, evidence-informed budget process should there-
fore remain a key health financing policy priority for all stakeholders. 
Those involved in NCDs can be strong advocates for this policy direc-
tion.  Earmarking can, however, contribute to garnering greater political 
support for public health taxes and, through this, marginally increase 
fiscal space for health.  In this case, it is important to use earmarking for 
activities or programmes of high national priority, in order not to under-
mine the overall objective of strengthening the public finance dialogue 
and priority-setting. Earmarking practices should remain as close as 
possible to standard budget processes: “softer earmarks with broad-
er expenditures purposes and more flexible revenue-expenditure links” 
(Cashin, Sparkes & Bloom, 2017). Earmarking could perhaps be effec-
tive in areas where it can catalyse significant change in previously under-
serviced areas, populations and conditions, such as health promotion 
and mental health, for which channelling regular budget funds might be 
problematic and may not have popular support. Finally, measuring the 
effective use and impact of earmarked funds is an important means of 
strengthening accountability.
2KeyMessage More explicit criteria should be used to prioritize the health budget linked to development and health objectivesEstablishing an effective revenue generation 
strategy and ensuring sufficient fiscal space 
are only the first steps towards ensuring that 
the funding allocated to health is translated into the 
right services, for the right people, at the right time, and 
that those services impact on outcomes. According to a recent OECD 
review, one fifth of health spending could be channelled to better use. 
In other words, this spending delivers no benefits, or worse still caus-
es harm, and lower- cost alternatives are not adopted (OECD, 2017). 
There are many such examples related to NCDs, including failure to 
reach the target audience with health promotion and prevention, late 
detection of hypertension, insufficient coverage of cancer screening 
programmes, unnecessary hospitalizations for hypertension, diabetes, 
and chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases, excessive and repeated 
211
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diagnostics and testing, delays in response time for stroke beyond 
the window of effectiveness, intermittent use of cost-effective chronic 
medicines, among others. Several policy instruments affect whether 
funding is spent on measures to improve outcomes, including prior-
itization of health budgets, purchasing and service delivery arrange-
ments, clinical practices, medicines coverage and other policies. 
 
Reflecting health and development priorities in the health budget is 
an important policy direction for strengthening the linkage between 
resources spent and outcomes achieved (see Box 12.2).21 There are, 
however, several challenges in this regard. First, the process for setting 
policy priorities is often separate from the process of setting budget di-
rections and ceilings. Health budget officials may not be able to bridge 
this gap; insufficient decision rights, timing of the budget process and 
lack of capacity have been noted as key obstacles. Second, weak-
nesses in revenue planning and tax administration may lead to ad hoc 
adjustments and create an unpredictable and unstable budget. Third, 
there is a particularly weak link between budgets and services where 
budget formation occurs primarily on the basis of input-based line-
item categories. This approach favours maintaining the status quo in 
resource allocation patterns and service delivery arrangements, even 
if they are inefficient and inequitable, since these criteria do not sur-
face in budget allocation discussions. It also lacks the flexibility to shift 
expenditures as needs change or savings occur, and can lead to un-
derspending and inefficiency. These factors make systemic transfor-
mation requiring shifts in resources difficult to discuss and implement. 
Challenges related to misalignment of resources and policy priorities 
are particularly relevant for NCDs. Other chapters of this report note 
several areas where a significant shift in resources would be need-
ed to achieve the desired transformation and scale-up of services. 
Chapter 6 highlights the need for sustainable financing arrangements 
for cost-effective intersectoral action. Chapter 7 notes the historical 
underfunding of health promotion and disease prevention activities, 
which undermines efforts to switch health systems’ focus from cure 
to prevention. Chapter 8 calls for complex multidisciplinary team-
based primary care, requiring investments and operational resources. 
Chapter 13 highlights the lack of effective coverage in several countries 
for cost-effective NCD medicines to prevent costly acute complica-
tions. Although these measures for health system strengthening would 
go a long way towards scaling up NCD interventions and services, 
they are difficult to reflect in the budget process in contexts where pri-
oritization of the health budget is not based on explicit criteria and not 
re examined regularly. This applies equally to settings with line-item and 
programme-based budget formation approaches. Admittedly, there 
21 See Cashin, Sparkes & Bloom (2017) for a more comprehensive treatment of alignment of public 
finance and health finance through the entire budget cycle including budget formation, execution 
and monitoring. 
Box 12.2 Benefits of aligning 
public finance arrangements with 
policy priorities 
Health sector policies and priorities are reflected in 
the budget. Health budget allocations are sufficient 
and stable enough to meet health sector objectives and 
commitments.
Funds are directed to health sector priorities. Funds 
can be pooled, allocated and disbursed across 
populations, geographical areas and time to respond to 
health needs and ensure equity and financial 
protection for target populations.
Funds are used effectively and efficiently to  deliver 
high-value services. Funds are directed to priority 
 populations, interventions and services, and payment to 
providers is based on service outputs and performance. 
Disbursements are predictable, and flexibility in purchas-
ing and provider payment ensures efficiency and value 
for money.
Funds are accounted for against priorities. The minis-
try of health and ministry of finance are both 
accountable for the proper use of public funds and effec-
tive delivery of health interventions, goods and services. 
Source: Cashin et al., 2017.
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are other factors making reallocation of funds difficult beyond imper-
fections in the budget process. For example, political economy factors 
surround reallocation decisions with implications for facility restructuring 
and health workforce consolidation and reprofiling. 
Two trends in strengthening public finance management have the po-
tential to strengthen the link between policy priorities and budget alloca-
tions: policy-based budget formulation and programme-based budget 
classification (Cashin et al., 2017). 
 n Policy-based budget formulation implies strengthening the qual-
ity of annual health budget proposals with well defined, achievable 
priorities that are linked to a policy framework, sector strategy, or 
national development strategy aligned with cost estimates. While 
the annual budget may remain based on inputs and line items, an 
explicit cross-walk to policy priorities can be made by reflecting on 
how to adjust budget ceilings. A medium-term expenditure or bud-
get framework can be helpful for avoiding underinvestment in areas 
that produce results in the longer term. These medium-term budget 
processes can provide more helpful opportunities for reprioritization 
in support of policy objectives than the fast-paced preparation of 
annual budgets. 
 n Programme-based budget classification implies classify-
ing, organizing and releasing the budget according to pro-
grammes with shared objectives, rather than along 
administrative and input lines. Policy goals can be explicitly incorpo-
rated into targets. Forming budgets and setting spending levels at 
the programme level (such as essential primary care services), rather 
than at the level of facilities or vertical programmes by disease, can 
ensure more efficient allocation across levels of care and can provide 
flexibility through reallocation of efficiency gains and savings within a 
given programme. Programme-based budgets provide a good op-
portunity to link spending to policy priorities. This is not automatic, 
however, and depends on how well the programmes are structured 
and what processes are in place to regularly reflect on priorities.    
Analytical methods and models can be used to understand how best 
to forecast pressures, cost new policies, and identify opportunities to 
shift resources from lower- to higher-value uses. Needs-based formulaic 
allocation is one such methodology, which is worth mentioning and is 
used in larger, deconcentrated or decentralized countries.
It is important that health policy-makers and health budget officials 
show greater engagement with and support for strengthening public 
finance management. Investment and training of health budget officials 
in public finance management principles would be an effective means 
of optimizing these processes at the country level. Change will build 
capacity. The timeline for attaining the Sustainable Development Goals 
affords opportunities for investing in the preconditions required for such 
change, which should not be abandoned in favour of easier or less 
intensive solutions. 
3KeyMessage An outcome-oriented approach is needed to fund intersectoral actions and address misalignment of incentives across sectorsIn making a business case for improving health 
outcomes, including those related to NCDs, 
health systems should harness the support and 
activities of other sectors. Key message 2 focused on 
the development of explicit criteria when determining the 
allocation of resources within health budgets. Assuming that adequate 
resources are allocated to actions to improve NCD outcomes through 
transparent priority-setting and needs assessment, further consider-
ation must be given to the extent to which some of these resources 
may be used to help facilitate actions to address NCDs, particularly 
through health promotion, disease prevention and early intervention 
measures delivered outside the health system.
Examples include actions to address underlying social determinants of 
health that will reduce risks or consequences of some NCDs. Although 
many of these actions can be funded and delivered within the health 
system, such as access to physical health training for high-risk groups, 
the health system may benefit from working with local government or 
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the education sector, for example, to reach the general population and 
encourage more active travel to work, or greater participation in sport 
and other physical activities. Tackling harmful alcohol consumption, for 
example, not only requires health system actions such as screening 
and brief intervention in primary care, but also work across many sec-
tors, including the finance ministry on taxation, justice and transport 
ministries on enforcement of drink-driving legislation, businesses and 
local government on retail access, advertising authorities on alcohol 
advertising, and schools on health literacy messages for young people.
Despite the importance of intersectoral activities to address NCDs, 
intersectoral financing initiatives have historically been modest in much 
of the WHO European Region. The scope for using financial mecha-
nisms to stimulate intersectoral activity is substantial. One consulta-
tion in 2013 found that only three out of 25 European Union member 
countries reported fully developed approaches to generating funds 
from different sectors for intersectoral interventions to promote gender 
equity and health (Aluttis et al., 2013). This situation is changing and 
momentum towards the financing of intersectoral actions is growing; 
a review in 2016 pointed to implementation and evaluation of range 
of actions at national and local level, both in the European Region 
and outside it (McDaid & Park, 2016). Box 12.3 provides three brief 
illustrative examples of actions where different financing approaches 
have been used to stimulate partnership working between the health 
sector and others.
To further stimulate and facilitate actions, health system budget hold-
ers, including health insurance funds, need to be able to objective-
ly justify why some of their resources might best be allocated to the 
delivery of actions in other sectors. Traditionally, the focus has been 
on highlighting subsequent short-, mid- and long-term health system 
benefits that arise from these actions, such as a reduction in the need 
for health services and long-term care related to conditions such as 
diabetes or cardiovascular disease. One specific example is the re-
duction in harmful drinking patterns associated with different sectors 
working effectively together in the Netherlands (de Goeiji et al., 2016).
It is not, however, simply a question of making a case from a health 
system perspective. Different sectors will have different priorities. They 
might not be persuaded that improving health outcomes is of suffi-
cient importance, even if they receive financial compensation for tak-
ing action. Crucially, health systems will therefore also need to become 
 savvier in the way they work with other sectors, to leverage additional 
resources from them for what are seen as mutually desirable outcomes 
(see Chapter 6). They will need to identify and highlight the benefits 
that are of interest to these sectors, including economic returns from 
addressing NCD risk factors or better managing NCD conditions.
Box 12.3 Examples of funding 
mechanisms facilitating intersectoral 
action.
 n KASTE Programme, Finland. This programme provid-
ed national discretionary funding for local government 
level intersectoral work involving two or more sectors, 
with a strong emphasis on activities to promote phys-
ical, mental and social well-being, as well as reducing 
inequalities in well-being and health.
 n State Public Health Promotion Fund, Lithuania. The 
Fund, which was established in 2016 using a share of 
revenues from alcohol excise duty, has been used to 
finance time-limited projects, some of which focus on 
NCDs. 
 n Co-commissioned Work and Health Programme, Eng-
land. This forthcoming scheme will pool financial re-
sources from the new Greater Manchester Combined 
Authority, which now has responsibility for most health 
matters in Greater Manchester, and the United King-
dom Department of Work and Pensions, to help deliver 
services and support to address the health (especially 
mental and musculoskeletal health) and employment 
needs of the long-term unemployed.
214
The economic return on investment in actions to address NCDs 
and their determinants is increasingly documented (see for example 
Dyakova et al., 2017; McDaid, Sassi & Merkur, 2015). Measures to 
reduce harmful levels of alcohol consumption, for example, as well as 
having direct health benefits, positively impact on the costs of dealing 
with road-related accidents and congestion, as well as antisocial be-
haviour and interpersonal violence. This can create potential opportu-
nities for partnership working, successful examples of which can be 
seen in many countries. Finance ministries can also have an important 
role in using this evidence to create the conditions to work across 
sectoral boundaries.
Funding mechanisms for intersectoral action 
for NCDs
Different funding and resource allocation mechanisms have been used 
to stimulate and sustain funding for intersectoral actions (McDaid & 
Park, 2016). Such institutionalized funding mechanisms are the key 
to enabling stable and responsive governance mechanisms (Chapter 
6). Their effectiveness will in part depend on regulatory and contextual 
factors. 
One commonly used approach is to agree on dedicated funds from 
the health budget for the express purpose of delivering intersectoral 
activities that will help achieve overall health objectives. Typically, the 
administration of such funds is managed at the national level by the 
health ministry, local health budget holders or local government. Social 
insurance funds may also set aside some funds for these types of 
activities. The process for allocating funding may be prescriptive, stip-
ulating that funding is linked to use of a specific cross-sectoral pro-
gramme to address a particular issue, or it may allow for innovation 
in the way in which a priority issue is addressed. The latter may be a 
competitive process where organizations from two or more sectors 
may have to develop a proposal regarding how funds will be used to 
address an NCD concern. 
Examples of this include the scheme in Finland, highlighted in Box 
12.3, where municipalities have applied for funding for intersectoral 
health promotion programmes, which have been used to support 
mental health activities in schools. In such schemes, initiatives tend 
to be time-limited and often small in scale, which may raise questions 
about long-term sustainability. The Public Health Agency of Canada’s 
Innovation Strategy may provide a useful example of moving to sus-
tainability; funding is provided in three phases for up to eight years, to 
scale-up intersectoral projects that have been shown to be success-
fully implemented and evaluated.22
Another approach is to establish an independent body or agency 
which can then set its own priorities for intersectoral action. Funds 
can be delegated to the independent agency from multiple sources 
of revenue or taxation, not just health budgets. One example of this is 
Health Promotion Switzerland, which receives funding from an annual 
surcharge on health insurance premiums. It then co-finances (through 
a competitive process) intersectoral projects that are aligned with its 
strategic goals, particularly in the areas of diet, physical activity and 
mental health. The challenge, however, is to ensure that the priorities 
of these organizations match those of the health system in general, 
including those for NCDs. Other examples of this approach include 
the Healthy Austria Fund and the recently established Lithuanian State 
Public Health Promotion Fund, which received 0.5% of alcohol excise 
duties in 2016 to support health promotion projects.
A practical way to leverage funding from multiple sectors is to adopt a 
joint budgeting approach. This can also be used to overcome inflexibil-
ity in funding within health systems. There are many ways in which this 
approach can be implemented on either a voluntary or a mandatory 
basis, for instance there may be budget alignment to address a specif-
ic issue, with mutually determined targets and outcomes, or there may 
be a formal legal process to establish a joint fund, often time-limited, 
to be spent on agreed projects or delivery of specific services. There 
are examples of formal and informal joint budgeting initiatives at the 
local and regional levels in England, which focus on health promotion 
among unemployed people with chronic physical and mental ill health, 
to promote return to work (see Box 12.3 above).
Common design and implementation features 
The effectiveness of these and other mechanisms for intersectoral 
action depends heavily on factors such as organizational structure, 
management, culture and trust. While this requires careful considera-
tion in the WHO European Region as a whole, it may be of particular 
significance in some Member States in the eastern part of the Region, 
which have less experience of intersectoral funding for health actions. 
In part, lack of trust across sectors might be overcome by highlighting 
cost-effectiveness and the return on investment for different sectors, 
22 https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/innovation-strategy.html (accessed 16 March 
2018).
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but this evidence base still needs strengthening and adapting to differ-
ent country contexts in the European Region. 
Sectors other than health should be included early in the priority setting 
process. This can help establish a joint sense of ownership which may 
help in leveraging funds and commitments from these sectors. There 
are also practical ways to develop trust that go beyond the scope of 
this chapter, such as the co-location of staff from different organiza-
tions in order to help build up relationships and strengthen trust (see 
Chapter 6). The contractual and regulatory mechanisms highlighted 
in key message 4 are also vital: even in systems with a long history 
of collaboration and cooperation, legislative frameworks that allow for 
flexibility in the use of finances, as well as mechanisms to monitor 
contracts and assess the attainment of targets, can help to ensure an 
environment where intersectoral actions can be sustained. 
Incentives should be aligned and 
optimized across the service delivery 
interface to reinforce a service delivery model 
oriented to population outcomes 4KeyMessage 
The fourth aspect of developing a health financing strategy for better 
NCD outcomes is to identify and address any misalignment of incen-
tives across the health system that undermines the envisioned service 
delivery model. To implement the service delivery arrangements out-
lined in Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10, strategic purchasing mechanisms 
must value health promotion, provide for early detection and man-
agement of conditions, reward task profile expansion of primary care, 
provide incentives to consider the full spectrum of care rather than 
the illness episode, reward individuals and groups working together in 
the interests of people, and foster work across levels of care. These 
service delivery dimensions are critical for all individual NCD services, 
including cardiovascular disease, diabetes, lung disease or cancer.  
Many countries in the WHO European Region are strengthening their 
strategic purchasing mechanisms to better align incentives with the 
envisioned service delivery approach. This area of health financing pol-
icy is a dynamically moving area. Most countries are adapting incre-
mental approaches to attenuate the weaknesses of base payment 
mechanisms and traditional incentives. A few countries are experi-
menting with larger, bolder and more disruptive changes (see Table 
12.2 below).
Incremental approaches to 
changing incentives 
In many European countries, incremental approaches have been used 
to address weaknesses in base payment mechanisms and the inter-
face across them. These approaches involve retaining base payment 
mechanisms and adding on further elements, such as pay-for-coor-
dination or pay-for performance, or carving out services for bundled 
payments whereby the whole spectrum of care provision for a particu-
lar condition is given one single payment for a defined period of time. 
Mixed or blended payments, which use two or more types of payment 
mechanism together to achieve an optimal incentive mix, are also be-
coming increasingly common (OECD, 2016). These approaches have 
not changed the fundamental payment mechanisms, but rather made 
adjustments on the margin. 
Pay-for-coordination is an example of an add-on payment typically 
made as a lump sum to a given provider, per chronic patient, to organ-
ize coordination of care through explicit care plans and collaborative 
care meetings, acknowledging the greater costs of these activities. 
Pay-for-coordination has been introduced in Austria, France, Germany 
and Hungary, among other countries. Experiments with this type of 
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payment began in France in 2009 with multiprofile primary care cen-
tres (OECD, 2016). Primary care centres receive payment for coordi-
nation and for NCD prevention and care (such as tops-up paid to GPs 
for diabetes screening), which they then allocate as they see fit; the 
rest of their business is paid predominantly on a fee-for-service ba-
sis. Evaluations have been positive both for uptake and for impact, in 
particular for diabetes management. They also echo findings in other 
incremental approaches showing that the impact does not necessarily 
come from large financial incentives but from making sure that coordi-
nation and care management activities are explicitly included in service 
baskets and are paid for with accountability for quality.   
Pay-for-performance to improve quality and efficiency on top of 
capitation payments or in combination with fee-for-service has been 
the “go-to” solution in many countries, including in the eastern part of 
the European Region (see Chapter 5). Literature on mixed payments, 
and particularly on pay-for-performance, is not easy to interpret. While 
there is general agreement that breakthrough quality improvement 
(defined in a comprehensive sense to also include outcomes) has not 
been documented (Cashin et al., 2014), specifically defined incentiv-
ized services saw significant scale-up once pay-for-performance had 
been introduced on top of capitation payments. Beyond direct impact, 
there is an ongoing debate about how extrinsic motivation affects in-
trinsic motivation, and whether the excessive use of pay-for-perfor-
mance creates a new culture between purchaser and provider where-
by all changes in the terms of engagement (such as changes in the 
service basket) will require financial incentives. 
A significant proportion of the available literature comes from higher-
income countries, which have reasonable payment rates in primary 
health care, while other parts of this literature come from countries 
with fee-for-service payment mechanisms. These results are difficult to 
extrapolate to settings with underpaid and understaffed primary health 
care services that have low capitation base rates and extremely low 
coverage of basic NCD-related detection and management services 
(Chapter 4). In such cases, pay-for-performance or selective fee-for-
service for particular services may provide a stepping stone towards 
more active primary care providers, and the additional funds may en-
able them to hire additional staff (such as nurses) to perform these 
labour-intensive activities. 
In this regard, there are encouraging examples from several countries. 
In Estonia (see Box 12.4), a modest pay-for-performance, which was 
introduced in a comprehensive approach to primary care strengthen-
ing, and linked to practice guidelines, contributed to the scale-up of 
early detection and management of cardiovascular disease and dia-
betes. In Lithuania, cancer screening was scaled up and the  incidence 
Box 12.4 Pay-for-performance in 
a comprehensive approach to primary 
care strengthening
In Estonia, modest pay-for-performance was introduced 
as part of a comprehensive approach to primary care 
strengthening and linked to practice guidelines. The fi-
nancial reward was small: just 2% of the budget allocated 
for primary health care. The incentive contributed to scal-
ing up early detection and management of cardiovascu-
lar disease and diabetes. An important lesson was that 
the behaviour change that ensued was less likely to be 
due to the funds themselves but rather to the informa-
tion that became available as a result of the programme. 
Some years later, it was recognized that weaknesses in 
the service delivery modality (solo practices and fragmen-
tation) cannot be rectified by further refining the payment 
mechanism, which has led to a complete rethink of the 
approach to delivering and paying for primary health care 
services in Estonia. 
Source: Good practice brief: pay for performance in Estonia (http://www.euro.
who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/287096/Good-practice-brief-pay-for-
performance-in-Estonia.pdf)
Estonia
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of late-stage cervical cancer was reduced after the introduction of 
pay-for-performance incentives. In Kazakhstan, hospitalizations for 
ambulatory care sensitive conditions were reduced in a comprehen-
sive approach using guidelines and pay-for-performance at primary 
care level for lower levels of hospitalization. Another particularly rele-
vant example for NCDs comes from Australia, where the pay-for-per-
formance mechanism has been structured to be fully aligned with 
what they term “a full cycle of care” for selected NCD conditions, such 
as diabetes or cervical cancer (Cashin et al., 2014). The full cycle of 
care encompasses detection, regular check-ups and condition man-
agement, with incentives for each stage in the process and a greater 
reward for fully completed processes.   
Bundled payment for selected conditions is a third type of incre-
mental approach, which is of particular interest in countries where 
fragmented fee-for-service arrangements are the starting point for all 
outpatient care. Disease-specific bundled payments have been intro-
duced in Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden (OECD, 
2016). Bundled payments provide a single prospective payment for all 
services provided for a patient with a specific condition over a defined 
time period, even if the services are provided by several providers. In 
the Netherlands, this approach was initially piloted in 2007 for prima-
ry care based reimbursement for diabetes, and scaled up to include 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and vascular risk management 
in 2010. The Netherlands reports several positive effects, such as im-
proved care coordination across providers and protocol adherence 
within a welldefined multidisciplinary approach with reduced reliance 
on specialists. This has led to increased satisfaction of patients and 
providers (Bakker et al., 2012; Llano, 2013; Struijs et al., 2012; Struijs, 
2016). At the same time, bundled payments group previously fee-for-
service-based payments in primary care without outpatient specialist 
and hospital care, which are the areas where the greatest potential for 
unwarranted cost shifting lies. 
While experiences with bundled payments are promising, thus far they 
only relate to mature health systems, which already have a long history 
of strengthening purchasing arrangements and payment mechanisms, 
and a well functioning monitoring system to detect potential adverse 
effects of financial incentives. It is also important to note the start-
ing point of a fee-for-service payment for outpatient care, and simul-
taneous fragmentation and duplication. Applying bundled payment 
approaches to less developed systems and different base payment 
mechanisms is not straightforward. Furthermore, as these payment 
systems are condition-specific, they can trigger service delivery re-
configurations for those conditions, which could create new silos and 
verticalization of services. Condition-specific bundled payments there-
fore do not seem particularly well aligned with the idea of broad-based 
integrated primary care, driving the redesigning of service delivery for 
all patients.  
The examples above and in the literature show that some of the 
weaknesses in commonly used base payment mechanisms can be 
overcome using incremental approaches. The main advantage of this 
approach is that it can be introduced relatively quickly to overcome 
inertia. Initial complexities can be adjusted to the experience and ca-
pacity of the strategic purchaser, using complex approaches, provid-
er management capacity and autonomy, available information sys-
tems, and an acceptable incremental administrative burden. Moving 
towards more complex payment mechanisms will strengthen these 
dimensions, build purchaser and provider capacity and contribute to 
Table 12.2. Potential to improve the incentive interface 
Pay-for-coordination Pay-for- performance
Bundled payment for 
specific conditions
Values health promotion, early detection and 
management
High High High
Rewards task profile expansion in primary care Moderate High Moderate 
Provides incentives for full spectrum of care (vs. 
episodic)
High Moderate High
Provides incentives for coordination and pathways High Moderate High
Rewards teamwork, groups, networks across 
levels of care
High Moderate High 
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strengthening the information system. A critical design aspect of more 
successful initiatives is clear: clinical practice and the model of service 
delivery need to be clearly defined for new payment incentives to have 
lasting effect. 
More evaluated experiments of large-scale 
change are needed 
While the approaches described above are common and likely to be 
an improvement on the typical interface of capitation, fee-for-service 
and case-based payment, they influence provider and patient behav-
iour without making any fundamental change to the basic incentives 
that do not support the envisioned service delivery model. They tinker 
at the margins without actually addressing the genuine root cause of 
incentive alignment problems. This is insufficient to dramatically trans-
form the way services are delivered. Bolder changes must therefore be 
made to the way in which health services are purchased. The problem 
is that proven, tested and evidence-based solutions are only just be-
ginning to emerge, and that lessons learned are not yet systematically 
available. More experimentation in large-scale change to purchasing 
arrangements is needed, with contextualized evaluations to identify 
success factors.   
Large-scale change would involve moving away from payment mech-
anisms defined by level of care towards full capitation for the totality 
of care for a defined population with care coordination intermediaries 
between the purchaser or payer and the provider network. We will re-
fer to this approach as “full capitation” to distinguish it from the capita-
tion payments commonly used in primary care. Population-based full 
capitation payments to providers or managed care organizations have 
a history in the United Kingdom (GP fundholding) and in the United 
States, in the publicly funded Medicare system (managed care). Since 
2012, a new wave of accountable care organizations has emerged 
in the United States in response to health reforms under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act.  In the WHO European Region, 
smaller-scale initiatives have been introduced in Germany, Hungary 
(see Box 12.5) and Spain. 
Compared with GP fundholding and managed care, these approaches 
all measure success by improved health outcomes and lower overall 
costs. The latter is often the source of incentives for participating pro-
viders as they benefit from shared savings arrangements. Population-
based full capitation for the totality of care provision normally means 
that providers receive payments for services in the traditional ways 
during the year, but if there are any savings at the end of the year com-
pared with the prospective budget calculated using the full capitation 
Box 12.5 Full  capitation and care 
coordination pilot
The Hungarian experiment covered 20% of the popula-
tion – more than 2 million people. Care coordinator status 
could be granted to a group of general practitioners or a 
polyclinic providing secondary level outpatient services, 
or to a hospital contracting general practitioners to enrol 
patients in the pilot. The minimum population size was 
50 000 people per care coordinator. The care coordinator 
was responsible for coordinating patient pathways across 
levels of care and providing care at their own level. The 
health insurance fund provided utilization data on all pa-
tients under the care coordinator to facilitate analysis. It 
also continued to administer payments centrally using the 
traditional payment methods to all providers, regardless 
of whether they were part of the care coordinator net-
work. An adjusted capitation formula for the full spectrum 
of care was developed and used as virtual currency. At 
the end of the year, savings were calculated based on 
the difference between the virtual capitation formula for 
the population served by the care coordinator, and the 
actual payments made to providers. The care coordinator 
received the savings and shared them with participating 
providers (general practitioners and others collaborating in 
improved patient pathways and care). They also received 
a fixed fee for care coordination and pay-for-performance 
for documented prevention programmes introduced, re-
gardless of the financial balance at the end of the fiscal 
year. The care coordinators were not budget holders and 
did not administer any payments, but focused on manag-
ing patient pathways in the system, ensuring adherence 
to clinical protocols and rational pharmacotherapy, re-
ducing unnecessary referrals to higher levels of care and 
broadening the capacities at primary care and secondary 
outpatient care levels for all conditions and patients.
Hungary
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Service delivery redesign and the coordination of care for all patients 
across settings and over time are inherent in population-based full 
capitation models. This is more likely to lead to large-scale system 
reform and address key weaknesses in the service delivery model. 
Since NCDs give rise to the need for health services across all levels 
of care, we should move beyond traditional thinking along levels of 
care and disease-specific programmes, and introduce large-scale 
system changes where financial incentives play a partial, but impor-
tant, catalytic role in system redesign for better population health 
outcomes and patient experiences.
In reviewing many examples of financial incentives to understand 
how they change provider and patient behaviour, common themes 
have emerged. First, financial incentives, be they pay-for-perfor-
mance, pay-for-coordination, bundled payment or full capitation, 
should not be introduced as an isolated instrument, but rather as 
an integral component of a systematic and multipronged approach 
to transforming the service delivery system with a view to scaling 
up prevention, early detection and disease management for NCDs. 
Other instruments should include guidelines, training, performance 
monitoring with feedback, better information solutions and task shift-
ing, among others. Second, while incremental financial incentives 
can help address some of the weaknesses in commonly used base 
payment mechanisms, they can only go so far in correcting misalign-
ment issues. Third, if the underlying service delivery structure is not 
effective (such as solo practice in primary care, lack of integration 
with outreach, lack of provider autonomy or ineffective staff mix), no 
incentives can fix these larger systemic, structural problems. Finally, 
policy-makers and purchasing organizations also have non-financial 
incentives at their disposal to steer provider behaviour and address 
misalignments (see Table 12.3). 
formula, they can be kept and shared among participating providers 
and the care coordination intermediary.  
A wel documented and evaluated experiment is Germany’s Gesundes 
Kinzigtal, a physician-led accountable care organization where both 
the providers and the insurer benefit from shared savings (Pimperl et 
al., 2017). Care models and patient pathways have been redesigned 
to make them more patient-centred with less fragmentation between 
providers. Preventive activities target patients with increased risk for 
particular conditions. Rational pharmacotherapy is a key instrument 
for improved patient safety, better health outcomes and significant 
savings. Successful arrangements use integrated IT systems that al-
low real-time monitoring of metrics which are connected to registries 
and public reporting systems (OECD, 2016). The experience is sub-
ject to rigorous evaluation and reporting on health outcomes (Pimperl 
et al., 2017) and on patient experience. Savings made continue to be 
a key driving force in system redesign and care coordination. 
The full capitation pilot for provider-based care coordination in 
Hungary is less well known, but equally valuable as an experience 
(Box 12.5). It has produced promising results and tested various 
organizational arrangements. It offered health-care providers the 
opportunity to be granted the status of care coordinators and take 
responsibility for the whole spectrum of care for a population (Gaál et 
al., 2011). The pilot facilitated cooperation between local health-care 
providers, incentivized improving care coordination and reducing 
fragmentation in the system, focused on prevention and early de-
tection, and strengthened capacities at primary and outpatient care 
levels. Savings, calculated annually and shared between providers, 
provided financial incentives. The average 5% annual savings were 
sufficiently attractive for the care coordinators and participating pro-
viders to make the extra effort to improve care and reduce inefficien-
cies in the system (Boncz et al., 2015). 
Table 12.3. Examples of instruments to address misalignment of incentives across the interface of care for NCDs
Financial incentives  Non-financial incentives
 n Payment for coordination across different providers
 n Pay-for-performance with NCD-related objectives and indicators 
in primary health care
 n Selective fee-for-service in primary health care
 n Disease-specific bundled payments
 n Payment below cost for ambulatory care sensitive conditions in 
hospital settings
 n Strategic use of volume constraints 
 n Full capitation 
 n Use of contractual obligations and commitments beyond payment 
 n Contracting groups of providers and thereby spreading risks and 
rewards to help with continuity 
 n Quality monitoring efforts 
 n Performance monitoring and feedback with benchmarking (exter-
nal) 
 n Greater investment in information solutions to self-track perfor-
mance at provider level (internal)
 n Non-financial rewards such as competition between regions 
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Table 12.4. Summary of key messages and policy responses
Key messages Policy responses 
Reasonable levels of public funding 
need to be allocated to health-
improving activities
 n Ensure that public funding for health is at or above 12% of total government 
spending. 
 n Invest in mechanisms, people, data, and skills to make a better business case for 
health and NCD spending and ensure the inclusion of credible plans to harness 
inefficiencies.
 n Engage in continuous strengthening of fiscal dialogue and budgetary processes 
to increase funding for health, and in particular for underfunded activity and pro-
gramme areas.
 n Apply high taxes to tobacco, alcohol and unhealthy foods to have a significant 
public health impact while increasing fiscal space, but have realistic expectations 
of earmarking. 
More explicit criteria should be used 
to prioritize the health budget linked to 
development and health objectives
 n Engage and support the processes of strengthening public finance management 
 n Invest in strengthening the public finance management capacity of health budget 
officials. 
An outcome-oriented approach is 
needed to fund intersectoral actions 
and address misalignment of incentives 
across sectors
 n Highlight outcomes and economic returns of specific interest to other sectors, not 
just the health sector, when seeking to involve those other sectors in funding or 
delivering actions for better NCD outcomes.
 n Consider joint budgeting, specific health system funding conditional on intersec-
toral partnership, and financing of independent agencies as primary options for 
financing intersectoral actions for better NCD outcomes.
 n Understand that financing mechanisms cannot work in isolation; issues such as 
governance, the regulatory and legal environments and measures to foster trust 
must also be taken into account.
Incentives should be aligned and 
optimized across the delivery interface 
to reinforce a service delivery model 
oriented to population outcomes
 n Identify misalignment and inconsistencies between the envisioned service deliv-
ery model and the behaviour encouraged by the sum of incentives in the system 
(move away from optimizing incentives within levels of care only). 
 n Adopt an incremental approach to rapidly mitigate weaknesses in base payment 
mechanisms.  
 n For countries with a strong tradition of strategic purchasing, experiment and eval-
uate larger-scale change to the incentives continuum.
 n Deploy non-financial incentives and the full range of strategic purchasing to influ-
ence provider and patient behaviours.
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Conclusions 
This chapter takes a holistic, systems view of health financing for 
NCDs. It has demonstrated that there are several important health 
financing policy areas that can impact on the scale-up of core NCD 
interventions and services. Reasonable levels of public funding need 
to be allocated to health and health-improving activities. To achieve 
this, policy-makers need to make a strong business case for health, 
including for NCDs, and become full and equal partners in a continu-
ous dialogue about budgets and public financial management. More 
explicit priority-setting criteria can help reduce waste and inefficien-
cies and ensure that funds are translated into effective services. Since 
intersectoral action has a significant impact on NCDs, stronger and 
more sustainable mechanisms are needed to fund it. Finally, to im-
prove scale-up of core individual services and care experiences for 
people with NCDs, incentives across the service delivery interface 
need to be better aligned. For key messages and policy responses, 
see Table 12.4 above.   
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